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Abstract
In the open economy macro literature with nominal rigidities, the currency in which
goods are priced has important implications for optimal monetary and exchange rate
policy and for exchange rate pass-through. We show, using novel data on currency and
prices for U.S. imports, that even conditional on a price change, there is a large differ-
ence in the pass-through of the average good priced in dollars (25%) versus non-dollars
(95%). We document this to be the case across countries and within disaggregated sec-
tors. This finding contradicts the assumption in an important class of models that the
currency of pricing is exogenous. We present a model of endogenous currency choice
in a dynamic price setting environment and show that the predictions of the model are
strongly supported by the data.
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1 Introduction
In the open economy macro literature with nominal rigidities, the currency in which goods
are priced has important implications for optimal monetary and exchange rate policy and
for exchange rate pass-through. In a large class of models used to evaluate optimal policy
prices are exogenously set either in the producer currency or in the local currency.1 In
these models, in the short run when prices are rigid, pass-through into import prices of
goods priced in the producer’s currency is 100% and it is 0% for goods priced in the local
currency. However, when prices adjust there is no difference in pass-through. With firms
thus exogenously assigned to currencies there can be sizeable departures from allocative
efficiency. A fundamental question then is whether indeed it is the case that when prices
adjust pass-through is unrelated to the currency of pricing. We address this question both
empirically and theoretically in this paper.
We show, using novel data on currency and prices for U.S. imports, that even conditional
on a price change, there is a large difference in the pass-through of the average good priced
in dollars (25%) versus non-dollars (95%). We document this to be the case across countries
and within disaggregated sectors. We then present a model of endogenous currency choice
in a dynamic price setting environment and show that these findings are consistent with the
predictions of the model. As firms mimic the short-run flexible price benchmark by choosing
currency optimally, the deviations from allocative efficiency are less severe.
In the empirical work we evaluate pass-through in several ways. First, we construct the
average monthly price change of import prices from each country into the U.S., for goods
priced in dollars and in non-dollars separately. We then estimate pass-through from the
exchange rate shock into prices over time. We find that there is a large difference in pass-
through into U.S. import prices of the average good priced in dollars versus the average
good priced in non-dollars at all horizons up to 24 months. One month after the shock
pass-through is nearly zero for goods priced in dollars and nearly complete for goods priced
in non-dollars, consistent with the substantial amount of nominal price stickiness in the
1For instance, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) assume producer currency pricing, Betts and Devereux (2000)
and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) assume local currency pricing. Devereux and Engel (2003) allow
prices to be exogenously set both in local and producer currencies.
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data. More interestingly, pass-through 24 months after the shock is only 0.17 for dollar
priced goods and 0.98 for non-dollar priced goods. The difference in pass-through therefore
declines from 1 on impact to around 0.8 at 24 months.
Second, we evaluate at the good level exchange rate pass-through conditional on a price
change. We document that even conditioning on a price change there is a large difference in
the pass-through of the average good priced in dollars (25%) versus non-dollars (95%). This
significant difference is shown to be present for individual countries and within sectors as
detailed as the 10 digit level that have a mix of dollar and non-dollar pricers. We show that
similar patterns also hold for exports from the U.S., even though only a neglibible fraction
of exports is priced in non-dollars. Specifically, exports priced in the producer currency
(dollars) exhibit 84% pass-through conditional on adjustment, while exports priced in local
currency (non-dollars) pass-through only 25% conditional on a price change.
We also estimate the difference across dollar and non-dollar priced goods in pass-through
after multiple rounds of price adjustment. We find that, while there remains a significant
difference in pass-through, this gap is considerably smaller than conditional on the first
instance of price adjustment. This arises because dollar priced goods pass-through 49%
after multiple adjustments, which is twice as high as after the first adjustment.
There are other important differences between dollar and non-dollar pricers. At the 1-2
digit harmonized code level sectors that would be classified as producing more homogenous
goods (following the Rauch (1999) classification) are dollar priced sectors. Sectors such as
‘Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils’, ‘Wood and articles of Wood’ and ‘Mineral Products’ are
dominated by dollar pricers. On the other hand there is a greater share of non-dollar pricers in
the ‘Footwear’, ‘Textiles and textile articles’, ‘Machinery and mechanical appliances’ sectors
that are in the differentiated sector. We also document that non-dollar pricers adjust prices
less frequently than dollar pricers.
The evidence presented in the empirical section are new facts that need to be matched
by models of open economy macroeconomics. We next examine how these facts compare
with the predictions of standard open economy models. Is the evidence consistent with a
model where firms choose which currency to price in? While there exist several important
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papers2 in the theoretical literature on currency choice, our paper is most closely related
to Engel (2006) who presented an important equivalence result between pass-through and
the currency of pricing. The two main departures we make from the existing literature are,
one, we consider a multi-period dynamic (as opposed to a static) price setting environment,
and two, we provide conditions under which a sufficient statistic for currency choice can be
empirically estimated using observable prices.
Currency choice is effectively a zero-one indexing decision of the firm’s price to exchange
rate shocks. If prices adjust every period, currency choice is irrelevant. However when prices
are sticky, the firm can choose its currency to keep its preset price closer to it’s desired price
(the price it would set if it could adjust flexibly). We show that a sufficient statistic for
currency choice is the average desired pass-through over the period of non-adjustment. This
medium-run pass-through is determined by both the dynamic path of desired pass-through
and the duration of non-adjustment. This result does not rely on the particular details of the
economic environment or the specific source of incomplete pass-through, that is whether it
is driven by variable mark-ups, imported inputs or decreasing returns to scale in production.
Intuitively, if a firm desires low exchange rate pass-through in the short run—before it
has a chance to adjust prices—the firm is better off choosing local currency pricing that
results in 0% pass-through in the short run. Conversely, if short-run desired pass-through
is high, the firm should choose producer currency pricing that results in complete (100%)
pass-through prior to price adjustment.
An important insight the model delivers is that currency choice cannot be predicted solely
by long-run pass-through or desired pass-through on impact of the exchange rate shock. As a
result, a firm, for instance, with a high flexible price (long-run) pass-through can well choose
local currency pricing if real rigidities lead to a low desired pass-through in the medium-run.
In addition we develop conditions under which medium-run pass-through can be measured
using actual prices chosen by firms. This is equal to the pass-through conditional on the
first adjustment to the exchange rate shock, as estimated in the empirical section.
2The papers in this literature include Giovannini (1988); Friberg (1998); Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2003, 2005); Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004); Corsetti and Pesenti (2004); Goldberg and Tille
(2005).
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We also study numerically a currency choice model with two sources of incomplete long-
run pass-through — demand-driven variable mark-ups and imported inputs in production.
We show that a firm is more likely to select into producer currency pricing the lower the
elasticity of its mark-up and the lower the share of imported inputs in its production cost.
In addition we show that the main results of the analytical section hold up well to several
extensions and the empirical estimate of pass-through conditional on first price adjustment
robustly approximates medium-run pass-through.
The predictions of the theoretical model find strong support in the empirical evidence,
as we document that pass-through conditional on adjusting prices is significantly greater for
non-dollar as compared to dollar pricers. Further, as theory predicts, long-run pass-through
is a less relevant statistic to evaluate currency choice with pass-through after multiple rounds
of price adjustment exceeding 0.5 for dollar pricers. Consistent with theory, non-dollar pricers
adjust less frequently than dollar pricers. We also observe an important sorting of goods,
with dollar pricers being predominant in the homogenous sector and non-dollar pricers in
the differentiated goods sector, which is consistent with endogenous currency choice.
The debate on whether currency choice is exogenous or endogenous is important as it can
significantly alter our understanding of exchange rate determination and optimal exchange
rate policy. It is well understood (following Caplin and Spulber (1987)) that the same median
frequency of price adjustment can lead to differing outcomes for policy depending on whether
frequency is chosen endogenously or exogenously. A similar reasoning applies to the currency
in which prices are set. With exogenous currency choice, one obtains stark results such as
the optimality of floating under PCP that ensures expenditure switching and of pegging
under LCP that ensures consumption risk-sharing (Devereux and Engel, 2007). This stark
difference arises because firms are forced to price in one or the other currency irrespective of
their flexible price desired pass-through. Once they are allowed to choose currency optimally,
they will choose it to fit their desired pass-through patterns enhancing the effective amount
of price flexibility and reducing the welfare gap between floating exchange rates and pegs.
There are other important considerations that arise with endogenous currency choice in a
general equilibrium environment, as pointed out in Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004)
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and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005). In such an environment exchange rate volatility
affects currency choice that in turn effects exchange rate volatility generating the possibility
for multiple equilibria. Consequently, a country that follows more stable monetary policies
will experience greater price stability as more of the exporters to that country set prices in
the country’s currency.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence. Section 3 de-
velops the theory and provides numerical simulations. Section 4 interprets the empirical
findings through the lens of the proposed theory of currency choice, evaluates alternative
interpretations and concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Data
We use unpublished micro data on import prices collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
for the period 1994-2005. This data are collected on a monthly basis and contain information
on import prices of a very detailed good over time, with information on the country of origin
and the currency of pricing. Details regarding the underlying database are reported in
Gopinath and Rigobon (2008).
In the price survey the BLS asks firms to report on the currency of denomination of
the price. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) document that prices are rigid, with a median
duration of 11 months, in the currency in which they are reported as being priced in. This
fact suggests that the currency information is meaningful and it is not the case, for instance,
that firms price in non-dollars and simply convert the prices into dollars to report to the
BLS. This would imply that dollar prices would then show a high frequency of adjustment,
which is not the case.
Around 90% of U.S. imports in the BLS sample are reported as priced in dollars. This
fraction however varies by country of origin. The fraction of imports in the exporter currency
is, for example, 40% from Germany, 21% from Japan, 16% from U.K. and 4% from Canada.
From all developing countries the share in the exporters currency is close to zero. As is well
known a significant fraction of trade (40% of the BLS sample) takes place intra-firm. Since
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we will test theories of prices that are driven mainly by market forces we exclude intra-firm
prices from our analysis.3
In our empirical analysis we include countries that have a non-negligible share of their
exports to the U.S. priced in both dollar and non-dollar currency. This includes Germany,
Switzerland, Italy, Japan, UK, Belgium, France, Sweden, Spain, Austria, Netherlands and
Canada.4 Table 1 lists the total number of goods (second column) for each country and the
fraction invoiced in the exporter’s currency (last column).
2 Pass-through and Currency in the Data
In this section we present empirical evidence on pass-through across dollar and non-dollar
priced goods. It follows mechanically that during the period when prices do not adjust,
exchange rate pass-through into the dollar price of goods is 0% for the goods priced in
dollars and 100% for the goods priced in non-dollars. The question we ask is what is the
difference in pass-through once prices of these goods change.
To address this question we present two main types of regression results. First, we
present estimates from a standard aggregate pass-through regression using average monthly
price changes, with the difference that we construct separate series for dollar and non-dollar
priced goods. We show that the difference in pass-through into U.S. import prices of the
average good priced in dollars versus the average good priced in non-dollars is large even
at a two-year horizon. Second, we present micro-level regressions where we condition on
the price having changed. We show that even conditional on a price change there is a large
difference in the pass-through of the average good priced in dollars (25%) versus non-dollars
(95%). We present both country-wise and sector-wise evidence that supports these results.
3For empirical evidence on the differences between intra-firm and arms-length transactions, using this
data, see Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) and Neiman (2007).
4We used the following two formal criteria for selection: (1) a country should have at least 10 items priced
in non-dollars; and (2) at least 5% of all items imported from a country should be priced in non-dollars. We
made an exception for Canada, which has only 4% of exports to U.S. priced in Canadian Dollars, but this
constitutes a large number of goods since Canada is an important trade partner.
6
2.1 Aggregate Evidence
For each country we construct two separate monthly average price change series — one
including only goods that are priced in dollars and the other using only those goods priced
in the exporter’s currency. For most countries, for exports to the U.S., these are the only
two types of pricing. Some goods are priced in a third currency, but such instances are rare.
The average price change was calculated using equal weights, since we were not provided
with BLS weights at the good level.
We estimate the following standard pass-through regression,
∆pk,t = αi +
n∑
j=0
βj∆ek,t−j +
n∑
j=0
γjpik,t−j +
3∑
j=0
δj∆yt−j + ²k,t, (1)
where k indexes the country, ∆p is the average monthly log price change in dollars, pi is the
monthly foreign country inflation using the consumer price index, and ∆y is average GDP
growth in the U.S.; n is the number of lags which varies from 1 to 24. Since the data is
monthly, we include up to 24 lags for the nominal exchange rate and foreign inflation and 3
lags for GDP growth. We estimate specification (1) for the full sample of goods and for the
two sub-samples of dollar and non-dollar priced goods.
The statistic of interest is the sum of the coefficients on the nominal exchange rate:
β(n) ≡∑nj=0 βj. These coefficients reflect the impact that the current change in the exchange
rate has on the price of imports over time. The objective is to compare these estimates
across currencies as we increase the number of lags included in the specification from 1 to
24. Figure 1 depicts the pass-through coefficients, β(n), from estimating a pooled regression
of all countries (with country fixed effects) against the number of lags, n, on the x-axis.
The line in the middle depicts the average pass-through for all goods. This measure of
pass-through increases from 0.21 with one lag to 0.30 with 24 lags. The feature that at the
aggregate level most of the pass-through takes place in the first two quarters and levels off
soon after is consistent with the findings of Campa and Goldberg (2005) and others who
have estimated pass-through into the U.S. using the BLS price index.
¿From just this aggregate measure however it is impossible to discern the role of currency.
Now we consider the separate currency series. The top line depicts the pass-through for the
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non-dollar priced goods. The bottom line is the pass-through for the dollar priced goods.
The bands represent the 95% confidence interval around the point estimate for each lag
specification. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the regression using only the contemporaneous and
1 month lag of the exchange rate estimates a pass-through of close to 0 for goods priced in
dollars and close to 1 for goods priced in non-dollars, consistent with the substantial nominal
rigidity in the data. Further, we observe that the pass-through increases for the dollar items
with the inclusion of lags. Note that the pass-through into the dollar priced goods is far
more gradual than pass-through into the aggregate index. Pass-through decreases slightly
for the non-dollar index. We might expect to see the two pass-through numbers converge as
we get past periods of nominal rigidity. A striking feature of the plot however is that the
gap between pass-through of the dollar and non-dollar index remains large and significant
even 24 months out. At 24 months the pass-through is 0.17 in the dollar sub-sample and
0.98 in the non-dollar sub-sample.
In Figure 2, we replicate the aggregate regressions country by country. Notice that
the aggregate level of pass-through varies substantially across countries. This can be seen
from the middle line in the plots. For instance, for Germany, the pass-through is around
40 percent at all horizons; for Japan and U.K., the numbers are smaller, as they increase from
23 percent to 32 percent; while for Sweden and France pass-through is always smaller than
20 percent. The difference between the pass-through of the dollar and non-dollar price series
is again striking. The exception to this is Canada where the two pass-through elasticities
intersect.5 For all other countries the differences remain large even at long horizons and
for 9 out of the 12 countries the difference is significant even for the specification with 24
lags. The two exceptions, other than Canada, are Austria and Netherlands for which there
is simply not enough data to statistically distinguish the two pass-through elasticities at 24
months horizon. Notice that in all other countries the confidence intervals for the dollar and
non-dollar pass-through do not intersect.
An alternative empirical specification would be to use individual (good level) price
5Average pass-through for Canada increases from 12 percent in the short run to almost 45 percent at
24 months, though these numbers are highly imprecisely estimated. One must be cautious to interpret the
evidence for Canada since the Canadian exchange rate is more likely to be driven by the price of its main
export—commodities—rather than the other way round (see Chen and Rogoff (2003)).
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changes for each country as the left hand side variable, without averaging across obser-
vations. So instead of one monthly observation for a country we have a panel of monthly
price changes for a country. We perform this panel regression where the left hand side is
the monthly change in the price of a good. We also include fixed effects for each country
and primary strata (BLS defined sector code, mostly 2-4 digit harmonized trade code) pair
and cluster the standard errors at this level. The impulse responses from this estimation
are reported in Figure 3. As is evident the impulse responses are almost identical to those
presented in Figure 1.
To summarize, aggregate pass-through even two years after an exchange rate shock is
strikingly different for dollar and non-dollar priced goods, with non-dollar pass-through being
much higher than dollar pass-through. Consequently, the fraction of goods that are priced
in different currencies has significant predictive power for measures of aggregate import
pass-through, even at very distant horizons.
Since prices change infrequently in this sample with a median duration of 11 months,
aggregate price indices are dominated by unchanging prices. Increasing the horizon of es-
timation to several months so as to arrive at the flexible price pass-through does not solve
this issue because around 30% of the goods in the BLS sample do not change price during
their life, i.e. before they get replaced. Consequently, when estimating pass-through using
the BLS index such prices have an impact on measured pass-through even at long horizons.
In the next section we estimate micro-level regressions that condition on a price change.
2.2 Micro-level Evidence
At the good level, we estimate the following regression:
∆p¯i,t =
[
βD ·Di + βND · (1−Di)
] ·∆cei,t + Z ′i,tγ + ²i,t, (2)
where i indexes the good; ∆p¯i,t is the change in the log dollar price of the good, conditional
on price adjustment in the currency of pricing ;6 ∆cei,t is the cumulative change in the log
6In the BLS database, the original reported price (in the currency of pricing) and the dollar converted
price are both reported. We use the latter, conditional on the original reported price having changed. Since
the first price adjustment is censored from the data, we also perform the analysis excluding the first price
change and find that the results are not sensitive to this assumption.
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of the bilateral nominal exchange rate over the duration for which the previous price was
in effect. Di is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the good is priced in dollars and zero
if the good is priced in non-dollars. Zi,t includes controls for the cumulative change in the
foreign consumer price level, the US consumer price level, the US GDP and fixed effects
for every BLS defined primary strata (mostly 2-4 digit harmonized codes) and country pair.
The coefficients of interest are βD and βND that estimate pass-through conditional on price
adjustment for dollar and non-dollar pricers respectively.
The results from estimation of specification (2) are reported in Table 2. The point esti-
mate for pass-through and the standard error for dollar and non-dollar pricers are reported
in columns 2–5. The difference in the pass-through and the t-statistic of the difference is
reported in columns 6–7. The number of observations, number of goods and R-squared are
reported in the remaining columns. The first row reports the results from pooling all obser-
vations. The pass-through, conditional on a price change, to the cumulative exchange rate
change, is 0.24 for dollar priced goods and 0.92 for non-dollar priced goods. The difference in
these pass-through estimates is large and strongly significant.7 We estimate this specification
for each country and obtain similarly that there is a sizeable difference in the point estimate
of dollar and non-dollar priced goods. This difference is statistically significant for 9 out of
the 11 countries, the exceptions being Spain and Canada.
One might be interested in the subset of goods for which the firm has arguably more pric-
ing power. Accordingly, in Table 3 we repeat the analysis for the sub-sample of differentiated
goods, according to the Rauch (1999) classification.8 The average pass-through for dollar
priced firms is 0.24 and it is 0.96 for non-dollar priced firms, in line with the results for the
7In an environment with endogenous frequency, conditioning on a price change can induce a bias in the
exchange rate pass-through estimates as it generates a conditional correlation between the exchange rate and
the residual even if the unconditional correlation is zero. The direction of this correlation is different under
LCP and PCP — negative in the first case and positive in the second case resulting in pass-through estimates
that are biased upwards for LCP firms and downwards for PCP firms. This bias therefore works against
finding a result of significant difference in the pass-through’s of dollar and non-dollar pricers. The fact that
we find a large difference implies that either this bias is small or the gap is even larger than we estimate.
More details on the magnitude of this selection bias in the simulated data are provided in footnote 26 of
Section 3.2.
8Rauch (1999) classified goods on the basis of whether they were traded on an exchange (organized),
had prices listed in trade publications (reference) or were brand name products (differentiated). Each good
in our database is mapped to a 10 digit harmonized code. We use the concordance between the 10 digit
harmonized code and the SITC2 (Rev 2) codes to classify the goods into the three categories. We were able
to classify around 65% of the goods using this classification.
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full sample of goods. This difference is also observed at the country level, with the difference
in the pass-through estimates significant for all countries except Spain and Canada.
Sectoral Evidence: In Table 4 we estimate pass-through (equation 2) at the disaggregated
sectoral level.9 The last column of this table reports the fraction of goods that are priced in
non-dollars for the particular sector in the BLS sample. There is substantial variation across
sectors. Most sectors that would be classified as producing more homogenous goods (using
the Rauch (1999) classification) are dollar priced sectors. For instance, the sector ‘Animal
or Vegetable Fats and Oils’ is wholly dollar priced. ‘Live Animals, Animal Products’, ‘Wood
and articles of Wood’, ‘Vegetable Products’, ‘Mineral Products’ are dominated by dollar
pricers. On the other hand there is a greater share of non-dollar pricers in the ‘Footwear’,
‘Textiles and textile articles’, ‘Machinery and mechanical appliances’ sectors. As we get
down to more disaggregated levels most sectors in our sample are either all dollar or non-
dollar priced. At the 6 (10) digit level, where there are 2 or more observations, 57% (63%)
are all dollar-priced and 5% (7%) are all non-dollar priced (the sample sizes are however very
small).
For 18 of the 19 sectors that have a mix of dollar and non-dollar pricers, the pass-through
of non-dollar priced goods exceeds that of dollar priced goods and this difference is significant
at conventional levels for 15 sectors. For one sector, ‘Live Animals, Animal Products’ the
difference is negative, but not statistically significant. The share of non-dollar priced goods
in this sector is also small.
We next examine differential pass-through within those 10 digit classification codes that
have a mix of dollar and non-dollar prices. We find that dollar pricers have a pass-through
of 30%, non-dollar of 95% and the difference is highly statistically significant.10 Lastly, in
our data set there are 125 items for which the currency of invoicing changed during the
life of the good. However, not all of them have a price change within each regime. When
9This table can be compared to Table 8 in Gopinath and Rigobon (2008). The two differences are, one,
the sample is smaller because we look at a subset of countries and two, we separate goods based on their
currency of pricing. We include fixed effects for each 6 digit harmonized code and country pair and the
standard errors are clustered at this level.
10Fixed effects for each 10 digit classification code were included and standard errors clustered at the
country level.
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we concentrate on that smaller sub-sample, and exclude the price change that exists when
the shift in the currency of invoicing takes place, for the dollar invoiced items the pass-
through is roughly 50 percent. The pass-through when the good is priced in the non-dollar
currency is 68 percentage points higher than when it was priced in dollars and this difference
is statistically significant.
Exports: This far we have focused on U.S. imports. In the case of U.S. exports the fraction
of goods priced in dollars is overall 97.3% and there is very little variation across countries,
unlike for imports. For instance, for exports to the Euro area this fraction is 96.4%. When
we estimate pass-through conditional on price adjustment, as in equation (2), we find that
exchange rate pass-through into local currency prices of goods that are priced in dollars
(producer currency pricing) is 84%, while pass-through for goods priced in the importing
country’s currency (local currency pricing) is 25% and the difference has a t-statistic of 3.88.
These results are very similar to those observed for imports across pricing regimes. Given
the small fraction that are non-dollar pricers we cannot however perform detailed sectoral
and country comparisons as was done for the case of imports.
2.2.1 Life-Long Pass-through
When we condition on a price adjustment we get past the period of strict nominal rigidity for
the firm. However, if there are real rigidities that arise say from strategic complementarities
in pricing and if competitor firms adjust at different points in time, then it is well known
that a single price adjustment will not measure the full pass-through that occurs when all
firms have adjusted their price. In this subsection we estimate a measure of pass-through
that incorporates multiple rounds of price adjustment and consequently allows for fuller
adjustment to an exchange rate shock.
We estimate life-long pass-through using price changes over the life of the good in the
sample and measure its response to cumulative exchange rate movements over this period.
Specifically, we estimate
∆p¯Li,T =
[
βLD ·Di + βLND · (1−Di)
] ·∆Lei,T + Z ′i,Tγ + ²i,t, (3)
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where ∆p¯Li,T is the difference between the last observed new price of the good and the first
price in the sample; and ∆Lei,T is the exchange rate change over the respective period.
11 We
have therefore one observation for each good that has at least one price adjustment during
its life in the sample and estimate the exchange rate pass-through over the life of the good.
The estimates of life-long pass-through for dollar and non-dollar priced goods are βLD and
βLND respectively.
The results from estimation of the life-long specification (3) are reported in Table 5. Life-
long pass-through is 0.49 for dollar-priced goods and 0.98 for non-dollar priced goods and
the difference is statistically significant. The difference in life-long pass-through is also large
and significant in different sub-samples, including differentiated goods and goods imported
separately from Euro and Non-Euro areas, in some cases exceeding 0.5. While for non-dollar
priced goods, life-long pass-through is not very different from pass-through conditional on
first adjustment, it is important to note that for dollar-priced goods pass-through is about
twice as high over the life of the good compared to the first round of adjustment. This
implies that it takes far longer than one price adjustment for these goods to attain long-run
pass-through.
2.2.2 Frequency and Size of Price Adjustment
Lastly, we report on differences in the frequency of price adjustment and the size of price
adjustment conditional on a price change across dollar and non-dollar priced goods. As
reported in Gopinath and Rigobon (2008), non-dollar pricers have longer price durations
than dollar pricers (14 versus 11 months).12 For the sub-sample of countries used in this
paper this difference remains. As Table 6 reports, the median frequency for dollar pricers
(0.10) is higher than that for non-dollar pricers (0.07). In terms of duration this is a difference
of around 4 months. This difference partly reflects the fact that non-dollar pricers are in the
differentiated sector where price durations are longer as reported in Gopinath and Rigobon
11See Gopinath and Itskhoki (2008) for more on this measure of long-run pass-through and how it closely
approximates true flexible price pass-through in several standard models.
12This drives the negative relation between frequency and pass-through conditional on the first adjustment
to the exchange rate shock reported in Table 11 of Gopinath and Rigobon (2008). Non-dollar pricers have
longer durations and, as we show in this paper, they have higher pass-through conditional on a price change,
which drives the relation in the table.
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(2008). To see if this difference persists at a more disaggregated level we restrict the sample
to those 6 digit sectors that have a mix of dollar and non-dollar goods. The median frequency
for the dollar pricers is 0.13 and for the non-dollar pricers is 0.08. Similarly, restricting the
sample to those 10 digit classification groups that have both dollar and non-dollar pricers we
find that frequency for the dollar pricers is 0.11, while for non-dollar pricers it is 0.07. The
standard deviation of the frequency measure is large across all specifications. The evidence
at the disaggregated level is therefore consistent with the more aggregate level evidence that
dollar pricers adjust prices more frequently than non-dollar pricers.
We perform a similar comparison for the size of price adjustment in the reported currency
of pricing, conditional on a price change. The median size of price change and the median
absolute size of price change are quite similar across dollar and non-dollar pricers. The me-
dian absolute size overall for the dollar pricers is 7 percentage points while it is 6 percentage
points for the non-dollar pricers. At the 6 digit level again the difference in the medians is
1 percentage point, while at the 10 digit level the difference is 2 percentage points in favor
of dollar pricers. There does not appear to be a systematic difference in the size of price
adjustment across dollar and non-dollar pricers. Since size is scale dependent it is difficult
to infer what the size measure implies about the responsiveness to shocks, as it depends also
on the size of shocks. This is unlike pass-through, which is scale independent and measures
the responsiveness to shocks.
3 Currency and Prices in a Dynamic Sticky Price Model
The evidence presented in the empirical section are new facts that need to be matched by
models of open economy macroeconomics. How do these facts compare with the predictions
of standard open economy models? Is the evidence consistent with a model where firms
choose the currency to price in? To address these questions we develop a model of endogenous
currency choice in a dynamic pricing environment with nominal rigidities.
While there exist several important papers in the theoretical literature on currency choice,
our paper is most closely related to Engel (2006). The two main departures from the ex-
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isting literature are, one, we consider a multi-period dynamic setting as opposed to a static
environment, and two, we provide conditions under which a sufficient statistic for currency
choice can be empirically estimated using observable prices.
In section 3.1 we consider a general model of currency choice in an environment with
Calvo (1983) staggered price setting. Using second order approximations we provide an
analytical characterization of the currency choice rule. In section 3.2 we numerically analyze
a specific model of incomplete pass-though and evaluate the robustness of the analytical
findings to various extensions.
3.1 Analytical Model of Currency Choice
We consider a partial equilibrium environment by focusing on the pricing and currency
strategies of a single firm. For concreteness, consider a firm exporting its product into the
U.S. Denote by Π(pt|st) its profit function from sales in the U.S. market, where pt is the
log of the current local currency (dollar) price of the firm and st is a state vector that can
include demand conditions, cost shocks, competitors’ prices and the exchange rate.
Define the desired price of a firm as the price it would set if it could costlessly adjust its
price in a given state. The desired price of the firm in local currency is:
p˜(st) = argmax
p
Π(p|st). (4)
The log of the desired price in the producer currency is then p˜∗t = p˜t− et, where the asterisk
indicates that the variable is denominated in the producer currency and et is the log of
the bilateral nominal exchange rate defined such that an increase in et corresponds to an
appreciation of the exporters exchange rate. Throughout Section 3.1 we make the empirically
relevant assumption that the nominal exchange rate follows a random walk and relax this
assumption in Section 3.2.
3.1.1 Price Setting in Local and Producer Currency
Now assume that the firm is allowed to adjust prices each period with an exogenous proba-
bility (1− θ), as in Calvo (1983). Further, when the firm adjusts its prices it can costlessly
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decide whether to fix the new price in the local currency or in the producer currency.
The value to the firm that sets its price in the local currency, VL(p|st), is characterized
by the following Bellman equation:
VL(p|st) = Π(p|st) + δθEtVL(p|st+1) + δ(1− θ)EtV (st+1), (5)
where st ≡ (s0, s1, . . . , st) denotes the history of states st−j and δ is the constant discount
factor.13 The expectations are conditioned on information as of time t contained in st and
on whether the firm adjusts its price in period t + 1 or not. If the firm does not adjust
it receives the continuation value VL(p|st+1) and if it does adjust it receives V (st+1). The
optimal price set in the local currency can be expressed as:
p¯L,t ≡ p¯L(st) = argmax
p
VL(p|st). (6)
Similarly, the value to the firm of setting its price in the producer currency, VP (p
∗|st), is
given by,
VP (p
∗|st) = Π(p∗+et|st) + δθEtVP (p∗|st+1) + δ(1− θ)EtV (st+1), (7)
and the optimal price set in the producer currency is
p¯∗P,t ≡ p¯∗P (st) = argmax
p
VP (p
∗|st). (8)
During the duration of the producer-currency price, its local currency value moves one-to-one
with the exchange rate and is denoted by pt+` = p¯
∗
P,t + et+`.
The value to the firm adjusting its price in period t that incorporates the optimal currency
choice is then:
V (st) = max
{
VL
(
p¯L(s
t)|st), VP (p¯∗P (st)|st)} . (9)
This maximization problem determines the currency choice of the firm when it adjusts prices
in period t.
We now show the following equivalence result for optimal price setting in the local and
producer currency:
13The variable component of the discount factor can be incorporated into Π(p|st), which then should be
interpreted as the profit in real discounted units. Since we later introduce first order approximations to the
pricing decisions, the potential variation in the stochastic discount factor does not affect the results.
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Proposition 1 The first order approximation to optimal price setting in local and producer
currency is given respectively by:
p¯L(s
t) = (1− δθ)
∞∑
`=0
(δθ)`Etp˜(st+`),
p¯∗P (s
t) = (1− δθ)
∞∑
`=0
(δθ)`Et
{
p˜(st+`)− et+`
}
,
which implies the following equivalence between optimal prices in the local and producer
currency:
p¯L(s
t) = p¯∗P (s
t) + et.
The first order approximations provide certainty equivalent pricing rules. Proposition 1
shows that two otherwise identical firms, one pricing in local currency and the other in pro-
ducer currency, will set the same price (in the common currency) conditional on adjustment.
The firm sets its price in each currency as an expected weighted average of future desired
prices in the currency of pricing. The only difference between the desired prices in each
currency is the nominal exchange rate, and the expectation of this exchange rate for any
future date is the current value of the exchange rate given that it follows a random walk.
Proposition 1 has an important corollary: If firms are assigned the currency of pricing ex-
ogenously, their pass-through conditional already on the first adjustment should be identical
regardless of the currency of pricing.14
3.1.2 Currency Choice
Now consider the problem of currency choice. Define the difference between the value of
local and producer currency pricing by:
L(st) =VL
(
p¯L(s
t)|st)− VP (p¯∗P (st)|st)
=
∞∑
`=0
(δθ)`Et
{
Π
(
p¯L(s
t)|st+`
)− Π(p¯∗P (st)+et+`|st+`)} , (10)
where the final expression is obtained by iterating the value functions defined in (5) and (7).
Whenever L(st) > 0 the firm should choose LCP and it should choose PCP otherwise.
14This corollary relies on the fact that the price-setting rule in Proposition 1 is optimal independently of
whether currency choice is exogenous or endogenous (see Appendix).
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When making the currency choice decision, a firm compares expected profits under the two
invoicing arrangements during the period of price stickiness.
To shed more light on the currency choice decision we use a second order approximation
to equation (10) and arrive at the following proposition,
Proposition 2 The second order approximation to the difference in value of LCP and PCP
is:
L(st) = K(st)
∞∑
`=0
(δθ)`vart(et+`)
[
1
2
− covt
(
p˜(st+`), et+`
)
vart(et+`)
]
, (11)
where K(st) ≡ −∂2Π(p˜(st)|st)/∂p2 > 0. Therefore, the firm chooses local currency pricing
when
Ψ¯ ≡ (1− δθ)2
∞∑
`=1
(δθ)`−1`
covt
(
p˜(st+`), et+`
)
vart(et+`)
<
1
2
(12)
and producer currency pricing otherwise.
Currency choice is effectively a zero-one indexing decision of the firm’s price to exchange rate
shocks. If prices adjust every period, currency choice is irrelevant.15 However when prices are
sticky, the firm can choose its currency to keep its price closer to the desired price in periods
when the firm does not adjust. Accordingly, as demonstrated in equation (12), currency
choice is determined by the weighted average of exchange rate pass-through coefficients
into desired prices, covt
(
p˜(st+`), et+`
)
/vart(et+`), where the weights are the product of the
discount factor and the probability of non-adjustment. The particular threshold value of
1/2 arises from the second order approximation. This result generalizes the main insight of
Engel (2006) in a dynamic pricing environment.16
We refer to Ψ¯ as medium-run pass-through (MRPT). The firm chooses local currency
pricing when MRPT is low and producer currency pricing when MRPT is high. Intuitively,
15Formally, if the firm adjusts prices every period, θ = 0, and from (11), L ≡ 0.
16Since in Engel (2006) firms adjust prices every period, but before observing the current state of the
world, the equivalent to (12) dynamic expression for currency choice would be
(1− δθ)2
∞∑
`=0
(δθ)`(`+ 1)
covt−1
(
p˜(st+`), et+`
)
vart−1(et+`)
<
1
2
,
and if the firm adjusts prices every period (θ = 0), it reduces to covt−1
(
p˜(st), et
)
/vart−1(et) < 1/2, as in
Engel (2006).
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if a firm desires low exchange rate pass-through in the short run—before it has a chance
to adjust prices—the firm is better off choosing local currency pricing that results in 0%
pass-through in the short run. Conversely, if short-run desired pass-through is high, the firm
should choose producer currency pricing that results in complete (100%) pass-through prior
to price adjustment.
Note that the covariance terms in (12) are not conditional on any contemporaneous
variables. That is, what matters for currency choice is the unconditional covariance of
exchange rate shocks and desired prices independently of whether this is a direct relationship
or mediated through other contemporaneous variables such as the industry price level, costs
or demand.
An important insight follows by re-writing the medium-run pass-through as a weighted
average of the desired price responses to exchange rate shocks:
Ψ¯ = (1− δθ)
∞∑
j=0
(δθ)j
[
(1− δθ)
∞∑
`=1
(δθ)`−1Ψ˜`,`+j(st)
]
, (13)
where
Ψ˜j,`(s
t) ≡ covt
(
p˜(st+`),∆et+j
)
vart(∆et+j)
is the impulse response of the desired price in period t + ` to the exchange rate shock in
period t + j conditional on information available at time t.17 The term in square brackets
is a weighted average of the impulse response of the desired price in period ` + j to an
exchange rate shock in `, where j is held fixed. For example, when j = 0 each term is the
instantaneous response to an exchange rate shock and when j = 1 each term is the response
one period after the shock. As j → ∞ each term is the long-run response to the exchange
rate shock. In general, therefore, MRPT and currency choice depend not just on the long-
run pass-through or desired pass-through on impact, but on the entire path of the desired
pass-through responses weighted by the probability of price non-adjustment. We show below
that this distinction can be quantitatively important.
17To obtain (13), we decompose:
covt
(
p˜(st+`), et+`
)
vart(et+`)
=
covt
(
p˜(st+`), et +∆et+1 + . . .∆et+l
)
vart(et+`)
=
1
`
∑`
j=1 Ψ˜j,`(s
t),
where the last step uses the random walk property that vart(et+`) = ` · vart(∆et+j) for any `, j ≥ 1.
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3.1.3 Structural model of incomplete pass-through
To provide further insights into the currency choice rule we need to put more structure on the
determinants of pass-through. We can express the log of the desired price in local currency
as:
p˜t ≡ p˜(et, Pt|zt) = µ(p˜t − Pt|zt) +mc∗(et|zt) + et, (14)
where Pt is the log of the sectoral price level, µt is the log desired mark-up and mc
∗ is the log
of the marginal cost in producer currency; zt denotes all other shocks that affect mark-ups
and costs, but are uncorrelated with the exchange rate and sectoral price level.
Denote by φt the elasticity of the local currency marginal cost with respect to the exchange
rate: φt ≡ ∂(mc∗t + et)/∂et. This elasticity can be less than 1 if it is the case that some
fraction of a foreign exporters costs is set in dollars, in which case exchange rate movements
only partially effect the dollar cost of the firm. For instance, φ can represent the constant
elasticity of output with respect to domestic inputs in a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Denote by Γt the elasticity of the mark-up with respect to the relative price of the firm:
Γt ≡ −∂µt/∂(pt−Pt). The mark-up channel of incomplete pass-through is the classic pricing
to market channel of Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987). In general, Γ varies with the
state st. Consider specific instances when Γ can be treated as a constant. Firstly, under
constant price elasticity of residual demand (e.g., CES), Γ is a constant equal to 0. A more
interesting case, however, is when Γ is a constant that differs from zero, that is the mark-up
varies but the elasticity of the mark-up is constant.18 To make further progress in studying
the optimal currency choice we assume that the elasticity of mark-up Γ is constant. We relax
this assumption in the numerical explorations of the next section. With a constant elasticity
of mark-up, we can prove:
Proposition 3 Let φ and Γ be constant and consider the first order approximation to price
setting. Then the impulse response of desired prices, Ψ˜`,`+j(s
t), is independent of ` and st
18If mark-up variability is demand-driven, one can write a demand system that results in constant Γ.
Since µ ≡ ln[σ/(σ − 1)], where σ is the price elasticity of demand, we have Γ = ε/(σ − 1), where ε is the
price elasticity of σ. Therefore, the appropriate demand system solves the following second order differential
equation:
ε = Γ(σ − 1), σ ≡ −∂ ln q/∂ ln p, ε ≡ ∂ lnσ/∂ ln p,
where Γ is an arbitrary constant measuring the elasticity of mark-up and q(p) is the demand schedule.
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and depends only on j, the time elapsed after the exchange rate shock. Moreover, it can be
written as:
Ψ˜j =
φ
1 + Γ
+
Γ
1 + Γ
· cov(Pt+j,∆et)
var(∆et)
. (15)
Finally, the currency choice rule can be rewritten as:
Ψ¯ = (1− δθ)
∞∑
j=0
(δθ)jΨ˜j < 1/2. (16)
The interpretation of (16) is exactly the same as that of (12), except that under the assump-
tions of Proposition 3, medium-run pass-through (Ψ¯) and therefore currency choice does not
depend on the state, that is currency choice effectively becomes a once and for all decision.
The impulse response j periods after the shock Ψ˜j has two terms. The first term is
increasing in the firm’s cost sensitivity to the exchange rate shock and decreasing in the
elasticity of the mark-up. It follows from (15) that the desired pass-through profile is entirely
shaped by the second term that is the impulse response of the sectoral price level to the
exchange rate shock interacting with the elasticity of the mark-up. If, for example, strategic
complementarities in price setting across firms are strong (Γ > 0), most firms price in the
local currency, and price changes across firms are not synchronized, then Ψ˜j will have an
increasing profile. As a result, the medium-run pass-through, Ψ¯, will fall short of the long-
run pass-through and the gap between the two will be increasing in the extent of the nominal
price stickiness quantified by θ. Consequently, we can formulate the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Let the desired pass-through profile be increasing, Ψ˜j ≤ Ψ˜j+1. Then the firm
is more likely to chose producer currency pricing, if (1) it has longer duration of prices
(higher θ) and/or (2) everywhere higher pass-through profile (higher Ψ˜j for all j).
3.1.4 Estimation of Medium-run Pass-through
The sufficient statistic for currency choice—medium-run pass-through—is a complex expres-
sion that depends on desired prices that are not observable. We show here that, under the
assumptions of Proposition 3, there is a way to estimate this statistic without knowledge of
the determinants of the desired pass-through profile.
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Consider a micro-level regression of a change in the dollar price of the firm conditional
on price adjustment in the currency of pricing on the most recent change in the exchange
rate, for both LCP and PCP firms. Specifically, we want to evaluate the coefficient in the
regression of
∆p¯t ≡
 p¯L,t − p¯L,t−τ , for LCP,p¯∗P,t + et − p¯∗P,t−τ − et−τ , for PCP,
on ∆et. Here τ denotes the most recent price duration and hence t − τ is the previous
instance of price adjustment. Denote the coefficient in this regression by βMR. We can prove
the following result:
Proposition 4 Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, βMR equals medium-run pass-
through:
βMR ≡
cov
(
∆p¯t,∆et
)
var(∆et)
= (1− δθ)
∞∑
`=0
(δθ)`Ψ˜` = Ψ¯.
Therefore, a relevant statistic for currency choice can be estimated by using observed prices
and conditioning on a price change and regressing it on the exchange rate shock. The
standard concern in pass-through regressions about omitted variables is not an issue here
since what matters for currency choice is the unconditional correlation between exchange
rate and prices.
Finally, note that βMR is the counterpart to the coefficient in the empirical regression
conditional on first price adjustment (2). The only difference is that in the empirical spec-
ification we regress ∆p¯t on the cumulative change in the exchange rate (∆cet ≡ et − et−τ ),
rather than on the one-period change (∆et ≡ et − et−1). Empirically, regressing ∆p¯t on ∆et
results in very noisy estimates due to the uncertainty about the exact timing of price change
within the month. In the numerical calibration of the next section we show that the two
regressions indeed result in very close estimates and the empirical specification (2) provides
a good approximation to βMR. Moreover, we show that this specification provides accurate
estimates of medium-run pass-through, Ψ¯, even when the assumptions of Proposition 3 are
not satisfied.
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3.2 Numerical Simulation
In this section we study numerically a standard model of incomplete pass-through and eval-
uate the currency choice rule. The purpose of this exercise is twofold. First, given a specific
model we relate both pass-through and the currency decision to primitives of the economic
environment. Second, within a more specialized quantitative model we are able to relax
the assumptions imposed in the previous section to verify the robustness of the theoretical
predictions. The overall conclusion is that the main results of the analytical section hold
up well to several extensions and the empirical estimate of pass-through conditional on first
price adjustment robustly approximates medium-run pass-through.
3.2.1 Demand and Costs
As in the theoretical section we retain the partial equilibrium set-up and consider the problem
of a single firm facing exogenously given industry price level dynamics.19 We introduce
two standard channels of incomplete exchange rate pass-through — variable mark-ups and
imported intermediate inputs. We then solve for the optimal pricing and currency decisions
of the firm in an environment with nominal rigidities and consider both Calvo and menu
cost pricing.
We adopt the Klenow and Willis (2006) specification of the Kimball (1995) aggregator
that results in a demand schedule with non-constant elasticity.20 Specifically, the demand
schedule for the firm is
q = q(p, P ) = [1− ε(p− P )]σ/ε , (17)
where p is the log of the firm’s own price and P is the log of the industry price level that
aggregates the prices of the firm’s competitors. This demand specification is conveniently
governed by two parameters, σ > 1 and ε > 0, resulting in the following non-constant price
19In an earlier version of this paper (Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon, 2007), we numerically solved for an
industry equilibrium and endogenous sectoral price level dynamics. However, all the important insights can
be obtained in this simpler environment that provides the flexibility to introduce a number of extensions.
20We view Kimball demand as a useful abstraction for modeling mark-up variability arising from strate-
gic interactions between monopolistic competitors. See Yang (1997) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008) for
alternative models.
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elasticity of the desired mark-up21:
Γ˜ ≡ −∂µ
∂p
=
ε
σ − 1 + ε · (p− P ) . (18)
In steady state, p = P and hence the steady state mark-up elasticity is given by Γ = ε/(σ−1).
The log of the firm’s marginal cost is given by
ct = φet − at. (19)
where φ is the sensitivity of cost to exchange rate shocks and at denotes the log of the
idiosyncratic productivity shock. This marginal cost function can be derived from a constant
returns to scale production function that combines domestic and foreign inputs, where φ
measures the elasticity of output with respect to domestic inputs. When φ < 1, this limits
the desired pass-through of the firm even if the desired mark-up is constant. We label this
the imported intermediate inputs channel of incomplete pass-through.
The firm faces exogenous stochastic processes (at), (et) and (Pt), and decides on the
optimal currency of pricing and price setting in a given sticky price environment. Specifically,
in the Calvo case, it faces an exogenous probability (1− θ) in any given period of being able
to adjust its price and currency of pricing. The decisions of the firm are governed by the
Bellman equations system (5), (7), (9) of the previous section. In the Menu Cost case, the
firm faces a menu cost, κ, that it needs to pay to adjust its price and currency choice. The
Bellman equations system for this case is provided in the appendix.
3.2.2 Calibration and Simulation Procedure
Here we describe the calibration and leave details of the simulation procedure to the ap-
pendix. The parameter values are reported in Table 7. The model is calibrated to monthly
data. We assume that both at and et follow persistent autoregressive processes. We set the
21The elasticity and super-elasticity (elasticity of elasticity) of this demand schedule are given by:
σ˜ ≡ −∂ ln q
∂p
=
σ
1− ε(p− P ) and ε˜ ≡
∂ ln σ˜
∂p
=
σ
1− ε(p− P ) .
The log desired mark-up is µ˜ ≡ ln [σ˜/(σ˜ − 1)] and hence its elasticity is Γ˜ = ε˜/(σ˜ − 1). A useful feature of
this demand specification is that it converges to constant σ-elasticity demand (CES) with constant desired
mark-up when ε→ 0.
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autocorrelation of the exchange rate process to 0.986 and hence can verify the robustness
of the theoretical results to the random walk assumption. The standard deviation of the
exchange rate innovation is calibrated to the data for developed countries bilateral nominal
exchange rates of 2.5%.
The persistence of the idiosyncratic shock process is calibrated to 0.95 to match the
evidence on the persistence of firm level productivity as reported in Bils and Klenow (2004).
The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks is set to 8% to match the average absolute
size of price adjustment in the data of 7%. The Calvo probability of adjustment is set to
match the duration of prices in the sample of 9 months and the menu cost parameter, κ, is
chosen to match this duration in the menu cost environment. Specifically, in the baseline
calibration, the menu cost is set to equal 5% of steady state revenues conditional on price
adjustment, which constitutes less than a percent of revenues on an annualized basis, well
within the standard range of menu cost estimates in the literature.
The sectoral price level is assumed to follow
(Pt − P¯ ) = α(Pt−1 − P¯ ) + (1− α)φ¯et, P¯ = ln
[
σ/(σ − 1)]. (20)
That is, the only source of shocks to the sectoral price level is the exchange rate. The inertia
in the price level is measured by α ∈ (0, 1) and φ¯ ∈ (0, 1) is the long-run response of the
price level to the exchange rate shock.22 Since σ/(σ− 1) is the steady state mark-up, p = P
in the steady state.
The cost and demand parameters are calibrated as follows. The steady state elasticity
of demand is set to σ = 5 which corresponds to a steady state mark-up of 25%, consistent
with empirical evidence and other calibrations in this literature (Klenow and Willis, 2006).
In the simulations we vary the steady state super-elasticity of demand, ε, and firm’s cost
sensitivity to the exchange rate, φ. Specifically, we vary ε on [0, 8] and φ on [0.5, 1].23 This
variation in ε translates into the variation in steady state elasticity of mark-up (Γ) on [0, 2].
22This sectoral price level process obtains in a linearized Calvo price setting industry equilibrium model.
For our simulation, we set α = 0.95 which corresponds to a 13.5 months ‘half-life’ for the sectoral price
level. We also set φ¯ = 0.5 which implies a 50% long-run pass-through into the sectoral price level so that the
exchange rate shock is neither purely aggregate for the industry, nor purely idiosyncratic to the firm. Note
that φ¯ can be interpreted as cost sensitivity to the exchange rate for the average competitor of the firm.
23Note that we always have φ ≥ φ¯ so that the cost of the foreign firm is indeed more sensitive to the
exchange rate than the cost of an average firm in the industry.
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The pass-through of idiosyncratic cost shocks into the desired price equals 1/(1+Γ), so that
when, for example, Γ = 1, the pass-through of idiosyncratic cost shocks is 50%.24
To solve the model, we iterate numerically the Bellman operator that yields value func-
tions and policy functions. From the value functions we directly compute the difference in
the value of LCP and PCP, as in (10), which determines currency choice exactly. From
the policy function we compute medium-run pass-through, Ψ¯, according to (12), which de-
termines currency choice approximately as it relies on the second order approximation to
the value functions. We also compute medium-run pass-through using formula (13) derived
under the restrictive assumption of a constant mark-up elasticity and evaluate the error
resulting from it and show that it is small. We compute the long-run pass-through as the
desired pass-through given the long-run response of the price level equal to φ¯. Lastly, using
the policy function, we simulate a time series of exchange rates and firm prices to estimate
the micro-level pass-through regression similar to (2) and evaluate the properties of this
MRPT estimator.
3.2.3 Simulation Results
The results described correspond to Calvo pricing unless otherwise stated. First we examine
how currency choice, medium-run pass-through (MRPT) and long-run pass-through (LRPT)
respond to variation in the mark-up elasticity Γ (driven by variation in ε) and the cost
sensitivity to the exchange rate φ. In Figure 4 we set φ = 0.75 and vary Γ on [0, 2].
We observe that both MRPT and LRPT are declining in Γ with the wedge between the
two increasing in Γ as firms put more and more weight on the sectoral price level in their
own pricing decisions. The dashed vertical line separates the regions of local and producer
currency pricing computed based on the value function. Note that the threshold of 1/2 for
MRPT provides an accurate approximation for the currency choice rule. At the same time,
24Note that in our calibration we need to assume neither very large menu costs, nor very volatile idiosyn-
cratic shocks, as opposed to Klenow and Willis (2006). There are a few differences between our calibration
and theirs. First of all, our baseline value for super-elasticity of demand is ε = 3 and we almost never need
ε greater than 5, as opposed to their baseline value of 10. In addition, they assume a much less persistent
idiosyncratic shock process and match the standard deviation of relative prices rather than the average
absolute size of adjustment. The interaction of these two deviations appears to drive the differences in the
results.
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LRPT stays above 1/2 for all values of Γ.
Figure 5 carries out a similar exercise, but now holds Γ = 0.75 (i.e., ε = 3) constant and
varies φ on [0.5, 1]. As φ increases both MRPT and LRPT increase with the gap between
them staying roughly constant. The dashed vertical line again separates the regions of local
and producer currency pricing. At φ = 0.77, the firm is indifferent between the currency of
pricing and its MRPT is very close to 0.5, while its LRPT is quite a bit higher, equal to
67%.
The overall conclusions from Figures 4–5 are the following: First, pass-through is in-
creasing in cost sensitivity to the exchange rate (φ) and decreasing in mark-up variability
(Γ) making local currency pricing more appealing when φ is low and Γ is high. Second, com-
paring MRPT with the threshold of 1/2 indeed provides an accurate criterion for currency
choice, while LRPT may not be a very useful measure for this purpose.
This is further evident in Figures 6 and 7. In Figure 6 we solve for the combination of
Γ’s and φ’s for which the firm is indifferent between local and producer currency pricing
using the value function. We do this for both Calvo and the menu cost model and plot the
resulting relationship between φ and Γ. In both cases a firm chooses PCP if it has high φ or
low Γ.
In Figure 7 we take the combinations of Γ and φ for which the firm is indifferent between
local and producer currency pricing based on the value function (depicted in Figure 6) and
plot for these parameters the corresponding MRPT and LRPT as a function of Γ (solid
lines). Note that MRPT remains very close to 0.5.
The theoretical MRPT was estimated using equation (12) without restricting Γ˜ to be
constant. We now examine how the value of MRPT would differ if we computed it under
the assumption of Proposition 3 that Γ˜ is constant at its steady state value of Γ. This is also
reported in Figure 7 as the dashed lines (MRPT′ and LRPT′) computed using Proposition 3,
to be compared to the solid lines. As is evident the two lines are very close to the correct
theoretical MRPT and LRPT respectively. This justifies our assumption in the theoretical
section that a constant Γ is a useful approximation point for empirical work.
The results this far relate to theoretical estimates of MRPT constructed from desired
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prices. In Proposition 4 we pointed out that MRPT can be measured using actual price
changes by estimating the price response conditional on first adjustment to the exchange
rate shock. We now use the simulated data to estimate this regression in order to evaluate
the quality of this estimator of MRPT. The results are reported in Figure 8. The dashed line
is the theoretical MRPT, while the other lines are coefficients from different specifications of
the pass-through regression conditional on price adjustment. We compute both the estimate
from the regression on a one-period exchange rate change (∆et = et − et−1), as suggested
by Proposition 3, and on the cumulative exchange rate change (∆cet = et − et−τ , where
τ is the price duration), as was done in the empirical work. Finally, we plot coefficients
both corrected and uncorrected for mean reversion bias in the exchange rate.25 The overall
conclusion that emerges from this figure is that all empirical specifications provide accurate
approximations to the true theoretical MRPT and the potential biases are not important
quantitatively.26 In fact, in our simulation the coefficient from regression (2), on cumulative
exchange rate change and uncorrected for mean reversion bias, provides the most accurate
approximation to the theoretical MRPT.
To summarize, the numerical simulation verifies the robustness of the theoretical results
to relaxing a number of assumptions. Firstly, we verify that the second order approxima-
tion to the value function of Proposition 2 is accurate and medium-run pass-through indeed
accurately predicts currency choice. Secondly, empirical estimates of pass-through condi-
tional on price adjustment indeed approximate well medium-run pass-through even in the
environment with variable mark-up elasticity, where the assumption of Proposition 3 does
not hold. Thirdly, the results are robust to mean reversion in the exchange rate. Lastly, the
main results extend to the menu cost model of price stickiness.
25Mean reversion in the exchange rate leads firms to adjust by less in their currency of pricing. This leads
PCP firms to have higher exchange rate pass-through relative to identical LCP firms and the size of this bias
is given by δθ(1− ρ)/(1− δθρ), where ρ is the autocorrelation of the exchange rate process. For empirically
reasonable value of ρ ∈ (0.98, 1), the wedge in the pass-through between PCP and LCP firms does not exceed
10 percentage points and is small relative to the documented empirical differences.
26This exercise was done for the data generated from the Calvo model. In the menu cost model there is in
addition the selection bias discussed in footnote 7. Consistent with that discussion we find that this reduces
the estimated gap in MRPT between local and producer currency pricers in the model generated data. It
turns out that this bias is small to moderate when we use the specification with the cumulative exchange
rate change. Specifically, with the selection bias, the pass-through estimate for LCP firm is 10-15 percentage
points higher than for otherwise identical PCP firm.
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4 Discussion: Linking Theory and Empirical Evidence
Amain conclusion of the previous section is that in an environment with endogenous currency
choice medium run pass-through that can be approximated empirically by regression (2)
should be lower for goods priced in the local currency as compared to goods priced in
the producer currency. In the empirical section we documented this to be robustly the case
across various sub-samples of the data. Tables 2, 3 and 4 all strongly support the endogenous
currency choice model’s prediction.
A second insight of the theoretical section is that currency choice is closely tied to
medium-run pass-through and not to long-run pass-through. LRPT could be above 0.5
but nevertheless if MRPT is below 0.5 the firm chooses local currency pricing. In the life-
long regressions estimated in Section 2.2.1 the pass-through estimates are almost twice as
high as pass-through conditional on first adjustment, with some point estimates exceeding
0.5. This is consistent with an important role played by real rigidities in pricing that have
effects significantly past the period of nominal rigidity.
A third insight, stated in Corollary 1, is that even when firms have the same desired
pass-through profiles they will choose different currencies to price in if the frequency with
which they adjust differ. Firms that adjust less frequently are more likely to price in the
producer currency. This is consistent with what we observe in the data for goods within very
narrow classifications. As reported in Section 2.2.2, even within 10 digit classifications that
have a mix of dollar and non-dollar pricers, non-dollar pricers adjust prices less frequently
than dollar pricers.
The standard international macro model assumes CES demand with constant mark-ups
and desired pass-through equal to 1. In this environment firms are exogenously specified to
be local currency pricers or producer currency pricers. Therefore, pass-through differs in the
short-run, but once firms adjust prices the pass-through is the same. In Proposition 1 we
showed more generally that firms facing similar demand and cost conditions set the same
price once they adjust. This implies that pass-through conditional on first adjustment should
be the same. Clearly, the data strongly contradicts this theoretical description of the relation
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between currency of pricing and pass-through.27
Let us consider departures from the theoretical specification that allow for exogenous
currency choice, yet obtain different pass-through conditional on price adjustment. One
possibility is that price setting is backward-looking in the sense that even when the firm ad-
justs it’s price, it keeps it close to the previous price. This generates differential pass-through
conditional on adjusting prices. This particular explanation with exogenous currency choice
requires that long-run pass-through is the same regardless of the currency of pricing. The
evidence in Table 5 suggests that LRPT is significantly different for LCP and PCP firms.
One could however argue that since goods are around for a limited period and get substituted
often, we are not quite capturing the appropriate long run. The median good in this sample
has a life of 3-4 years. This explanation therefore would imply that the effects of nominal
and real rigidities remain well past this horizon.
A second piece of evidence against exogenous currency of pricing is that we observe
sorting in the data. That is there are sectors that are dominated by dollar pricers and those
by non-dollar pricers. So there is the interesting question of why certain sectors such as
‘Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils’ are dominated by dollar pricers, while ‘Machinery and
Mechanical Appliances’ by non-dollar pricers. Further, there are interesting differences even
within narrow sectors that have a mix of dollar and non-dollar pricers. Non-dollar pricers
tend to adjust prices less frequently than dollar pricers. These features are consistent with
a model of endogenous currency choice, but less obvious in an environment with exogenous
currency choice.
A second possible hypothesis is that suppose for exogenous institutional reasons sectors
with identical long-run pass-through get sorted into local and producer currency pricing
bins. In this case, and if there are significant real rigidities in pricing that generate delayed
price adjustments, a single firm in each sector will adjust its price by small amounts in
the currency of pricing. In this case, firms in the sector dominated by producer currency
pricers will have higher MRPT than firms in the sector dominated by local currency pricers,
27The result of the proposition is exact when the nominal exchange rate follows a random walk. If the
exchange rate mean reverts, we pointed out that for empirically reasonable values of mean reversion the
wedge in pass-through conditional on adjusting prices falls far short of the empirical wedge of 70 points.
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even if eventually LRPT is the same for all firms in both sectors. However the fact that
even within narrow 10 digit sectors there is a mix of dollar and non-dollar pricers limits the
generality of this explanation. It is hard to think of institutional reasons why at this level
of disaggregation there is exogenous sorting of firms.
While several of our findings are consistent with an environment of endogenous currency
choice and these findings rule out certain models of currency and pass-through, there is more
work to be done. The ideal test for whether endogenous currency choice is the over-riding
mechanism would be to relate firm-level characteristics shaping mark-up variability and cost
sensitivity to the currency choice decision. This requires extensive firm-level information
that can be hard to come by, as is well known in the pass-through literature. Using aggre-
gated data, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) and Goldberg and Tille (2005) present some
evidence consistent with endogenous currency choice.
A strength of our analysis is that we provide a simple sufficient statistic for currency
choice that summarizes complicated pieces of information. In this sense it is less sensitive
to details about difficult to measure elements of the pass-through environment. Further
research on the underlying determinants will be clearly valuable though beyond the scope of
the current paper.
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Appendix
A Proofs of Results for Section 3.1
Proof of Proposition 1: From the Bellman equations (5) and (7) and using the Envelope
Theorem, we have the first order conditions for price setting by an LCP and PCP firm respectively:∑∞
`=0(δθ)
`EtΠp
(
p¯L,t|st+`
)
= 0,∑∞
`=0(δθ)
`EtΠp
(
p¯∗P,t + et+`|st+`
)
= 0,
where the subscript denotes the respective partial derivative. Note that, with Calvo pricing, preset
prices affect the value function only through profits in the states in which they are effective, which is
determined exogenously and, hence, these optimality conditions do not depend on whether currency
choice is exogenous or endogenous.
First consider the LCP case. We take a first order Taylor approximation to the marginal profit
state by state around that state’s optimal price:
Πp
(
p¯L,t|st+`
)
= Π˜pp(st+`) [p¯L,t − p˜t+`] +O(p¯L,t − p˜t+`)2
= Π˜pp(st) [p¯L,t − p˜t+`] +O(p¯L,t − p˜t+`)2 +O
(‖st+` − st‖ · (p¯L,t − p˜t+`)),
where p˜t+` ≡ p˜(st+`), Π˜pp(st+`) ≡ Πpp(p˜t+`|st+`), O(·) denotes the same order of magnitude,
‖ · ‖ is some norm in a vector space. The derivation of this approximation uses the first order
optimality of the desired price p˜t+` that implies Πp(p˜t+`|st+`) = 0 and the fact that Π˜pp(st+`) =
Π˜pp(st) + O(‖st+` − st‖) that follows from the smoothness of the profit function and the desired
price in the state of the economy (i.e., this requires convexity and continuous second derivatives of
Π(·), which we assume hold).
We then combine this approximation with the first order condition above, and obtain the
following first order approximation for the preset price:∑∞
`=0(δθ)
`Et {p¯L,t − p˜t+`} = 0 + α2,
where one can verify that
α ≡ Op
(∑∞
`=0(δθ)
`‖st+` − st‖
)
,
with Op(·) denoting the same order of magnitude in the probabilistic sense. After rearranging, this
delivers the first claim of the proposition for LCP firms. Analogous steps result in a similar result
for PCP firms: ∑∞
`=0(δθ)
`Et
{
p¯∗P,t + et+` − p˜t+`
}
= 0 + α2.
Subtracting the expression for PCP from that for LCP firms, multiplying through by (1− δθ)
and rearranging, we have:
p¯L,t = p¯∗P,t + (1− δθ)
∑∞
`=0(δθ)
`Etet+` + α2.
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When exchange rate follows a random walk, Etet+` = et and we have p¯∗P,t + et − p¯L,t = α2, which
completes the proof of the proposition.28
Finally, we assess the magnitude of the error of approximation α. Denote by σs ≡ Op(‖∆st‖)
the magnitude of the standard deviation of the innovation to the state of the economy. Allowing
for a unit root in {st}, we have Op(‖st+` − st‖) = `σs. Therefore,
α = σs
∑∞
`=0(δθ)
`` = σsδθ/(1− δθ)2.
That is, even in an environment with an integrated state of the economy, the error of approximation
still has the order of the standard deviation of the one-period innovation to the state vector, as
long as the duration of prices is finite (more accurately, as long as δθ < 1). ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: Recall that the difference in the value to the firm of LCP and PCP
is:
Lt =
∑∞
`=0(δθ)
`Et
{
Π
(
p¯L,t|st+`
)−Π(p¯∗P,t+et+` |st+`)} .
We take a second order Taylor expansion of the profit differential state by state around the respective
desired price:
Π
(
p¯L,t|st+`
)−Π(p¯∗P,t+et+` |st+`) = 12Π˜pp(st+`) [(p¯L,t − p˜t+`)2 − (p¯∗P,t + et+` − p˜t+`)2]+ α3,
where we use the same notation as in the Proof of Proposition 1. Using again the fact that
Π˜pp(st+`) = Π˜pp(st) + α, we can rewrite:
Lt = 12Π˜pp(st)
∞∑
`=0
(δθ)` Et
{(
p¯L,t − p˜t+`
)2 − (p¯∗P,t + et+` − p˜t+`)2}+ α3.
Expanding the expression inside the brackets, we obtain:(
p¯L,t − p˜t+`
)2 − (p¯∗P,t + et+` − p˜t+`)2 = (p¯L,t − p¯∗P,t − et+`)(p¯L,tp¯∗P,t + et+` − 2p˜t+`)
= −(et+` − et + α2)(p¯L,t + p¯∗P,t + et+` − 2p˜t+`),
where the second equality used the equivalence result of Proposition 1. Substituting this into the
expression for Lt, we have
Lt = −12Π˜pp(st)
∞∑
`=0
(δθ)` covt
(
et+`, et+` − 2p˜t+`
)
+ α3,
28If exchange rate follows a first order autoregressive process with autocorrelation ρ, we have Etet+` = ρ`et
and therefore:
p¯∗P,t + et − p¯L,t =
δθ(1− ρ)
1− δθρ et + α
2.
Mean reversion in the exchange rate introduces a wedge between PCP and LCP pricing proportional to
(1 − ρ). We discuss the magnitude of this wedge and its implications for the measurement of pass-through
in Section 3.2.
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where we use the fact from Proposition 1 that
∑∞
`=0(δθ)
`Et
{
p¯L,t + p¯∗P,t + et+` − 2p˜t+`
}
= α2.
Expanding the covariance term immediately results in expression (11) of Proposition 2. Finally, by
the random walk property of the exchange rate, we have vart(et+`) = `vart(∆et+j) for any `, j > 0.
Therefore, Lt < 0 is approximately equivalent to (12). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: With constant elasticity of mark-up and constant marginal cost
sensitivity to the exchange rate, the expression for the desired price is:
p˜t = −Γ
(
p˜t − Pt
)
+ φet + ξt,
where ξt combines a constant and all shocks to mark-ups and marginal cost orthogonal to the
exchange rate. This expression can be rewritten as
p˜t =
φ
1 + Γ
et +
Γ
1 + Γ
Pt +
ξt
1 + Γ
and the impulse response of p˜t+` to et+j conditional on information as of period t is
Ψ˜j,`(st) =
φ
1 + Γ
+
Γ
1 + Γ
covt(Pt+`,∆et+j)
vart(∆et+j)
,
as stated in the proposition. Assuming that the sectoral price level follows a linear process:29
(Pt − P¯ ) = α(Pt−1 − P¯ ) + (1− α)φ¯et + ξP,t,
we have
covt(Pt+`,∆et+j)
vart(∆et+j)
=
(
1− α`−j+1)φ¯.
Therefore, indeed, Ψ˜j,`(st) depends only on ` − j and does not depend on st. Moreover, the
medium-run pass-through equals
Ψ¯ =
φ
1 + Γ
+
Γφ¯
1 + Γ
(1− δθ)
∞∑
`=0
(δθ)`
(
1− α`+1) = φ
1 + Γ
+
Γφ¯
1 + Γ
1− α
1− δθα,
which is increasing in θ. ¥
29This process can be shown to be the sectoral equilibrium outcome in a linearized Calvo model with α
determined by the primitives of the model.
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Proof of Proposition 4: First, we show that
cov
(
∆p¯t,∆et
)
var(∆et)
=
cov
(
p¯t,∆et
)
var(∆et)
.
This follows from
cov
(
p¯t−k,∆et
)
= E
{
p¯t−k ·∆et
}
= E
{
Et−k
{
p¯t−k ·∆et
}}
= 0,
where we have use the law of iterated expectations and the fact that Et−k∆et = 0. Next, it follows
from Proposition 1, that
cov
(
p¯t,∆et
)
= (1− δθ)
∞∑
`=0
(δθ)`
cov(Etp˜t+`,∆et)
var(∆et)
.
Note that
cov
(
Etp˜t+`,∆et
)
= E {∆et · Etp˜t+`} = E {Et {p˜t+` ·∆et}} = cov(p˜t+`,∆et),
again using the law of iterated expectations and the random walk property of the exchange rate.
Proposition 4 follows immediately. ¥
B Details for the Numerical Simulation of Section 3.2
The profit of the firm in local currency is given by
Π(pt|Pt, et, at) =
[
exp(pt)− exp(φet − at)
] · q(pt, Pt).
For the Calvo case, we iterate the Bellman operator defined by (5), (7) and (9) to solve for the
value functions. For the Menu Cost case, the Bellman equations system is give by
VL(p|st) = Π(p|st) + Etmax{VL(p|st+1), V (st+1)− κ},
VP (p∗|st) = Π(p∗ + et|st) + Etmax{VP (p∗|st+1), V (st+1)− κ},
V (st) = max
{
VL
(
p¯L(st)|st
)
, VP
(
p¯∗P (s
t)|st)} ,
where the policy functions are given by:
p¯L(st) = argmax
p
VL(p|st),
p¯∗P (s
t) = argmax
p∗
VP (p∗|st).
Additionally, the policy function specifies in which states the firm adjusts its price and what cur-
rency it chooses.
In both cases, the state vector contains the previous price of the firm, the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock, the sectoral price level and the nominal exchange rate: st = (pt−1, at, Pt, et). The
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expectations in the Bellman operators are with respect to (at, Pt, et). All three follow exogenous
first order processes with {at} independent from {et, Pt}. We iterate the Bellman equations on a
discreet grid.30
After obtaining the policy functions, we simulate in the given partial equilibrium environment
the firm’s price for T = 12, 000 periods, where the period is calibrated to be a month. Using the
policy function and the simulated data, we study the currency choice and pass-through patterns
for different values of primitive parameters. We determine currency choice by evaluating L =
VL
(
p¯L
) − VP (p¯∗P ).31 For Figures 6 and 7 we find the set of parameter values {(φ,Γ)} for which
L = 0 at an initial state, s0, at which p = P = P¯ .
We calculate MRPT according to its definition (16) by simulating a path of desired prices,
p˜t, for 10, 000 realizations of the exchange rate, sectoral price level and idiosyncratic shocks and
estimate cov0(p˜t, et)/var0(et). We compute LRPT using the definition of desired price (equation 4).
Specifically, for multiple realizations of the shocks (et, at) and conditioning on the long-run response
of the sectoral price level (equal to φ¯et), we compute p˜t and evaluate the regression coefficient of
desired prices on the exchange rate, which defines our long-run pass-through measure.
In addition, we compute MRPT and LRPT under the restrictive assumption that mark-up
elasticity is constant at its steady state level Γ. As suggested by Proposition 3, these measures are:
MRPT′ =
φ
1 + Γ
+
Γφ¯
1 + Γ
1− α
1− αδθ and LRPT
′ =
φ
1 + Γ
+
Γφ¯
1 + Γ
.
Lastly, we compute the regression-based estimates of MRPT.We have a simulated series of firm’s
prices and exchange rates. Using these series, we estimate the micro-level pass-through regression
conditional on price adjustment, equivalent to our empirical specification (2). We estimate both
specifications, with the one-period exchange rate change (∆et = et − et−1) and the cumulative
exchange rate change (∆cet = et − et−τ , where τ is the previous price duration) as right hand side
variables. In addition, we estimate the mean reversion bias corrected estimates given by:
Ψˆb.c.L = ΨˆL
1− δθρe
1− δθ and Ψˆ
b.c.
P = 1−
(
1− ΨˆP
)1− δθρe
1− δθ ,
where ρe is the autocorrelation of the exchange rate process. Note that given the same underlying
MRPT, the cumulative bias of PCP and LCP MRPT is
ΨˆP − ΨˆL = δθ(1− ρe)1− δθρe ,
independently of the value of MRPT (see the Proof of Proposition 1).
30The step of the grid for individual price pt is no greater than 0.5% and no greater than 0.2% for the
sectoral price level. There are 15 points on the grid for the idiosyncratic shock and 31 for the nominal
exchange rate.
31There are currency switches over time but they are rare for most values of the parameters and would be
absent altogether if there was a small fixed cost of currency switching.
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Figure 1: Aggregate ERPT at different horizons by currency
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Figure 3: Aggregate ERPT at different horizons by currency: Panel specification
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Figure 4: Currency Choice, MRPT and LRPT as a function of mark-up elasticity, Γ
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Cost Sensitivity to Exchange Rate, φ
M
R
PT
 a
nd
 L
RP
T
LRPT
MRPT
PCPLCP
Figure 5: Currency Choice, MRPT and LRPT as a function of cost sensitivity to the exchange
rate, φ
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Figure 6: Currency Choice in the (Γ, φ)-space
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Figure 7: MRPT and LRPT for the firm indifferent between LCP and PCP, as a function of
Γ (MRPT′ and LRPT′ are computed under the restrictive assumption that Γ˜ ≡ Γ = const)
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Figure 8: Empirical MRPT: Pass-through Conditional on Price Adjustment
Country N FracND
Germany 1,156 0.40
Switzerland 220 0.38
Italy 1,112 0.22
Japan 2,553 0.21
UK 719 0.19
Belgium 122 0.17
France 582 0.13
Sweden 181 0.12
Spain 261 0.11
Austria 93 0.10
Netherlands 148 0.10
Canada 1,906 0.04
Table 1: Number of Goods and Fraction Non-Dollar Priced
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Dollar Pricers Non-Dollar Pricers
All 6-digit 10-digit All 6-digit 10-digit
Frequency
Median 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.07
Mean 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.12
SD 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.16
Size
Median 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Mean 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
SD 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.12
Abs. Size
Median 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06
Mean 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08
SD 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.11
Table 6: Frequency and Size of Price Adjustment: Dollar vs. Non-Dollar Pricers
Parameter Symbol Value Source
Discount Factor δ 0.941/12 Monthly data
St.dev. of et σe 2.5% Data
Persistence of et ρe 0.99 Data
St.dev. of at σa 8.0% Absolute Size of Price Adjustment
Persistence of at ρa 0.95 Bils and Klenow (2004)
Inertia in Pt α 0.95
Long-run response of Pt φ¯ 50%
Cost sensitivity φ 0.75 Input-Output Tables
Calvo parameter θ 0.875 Price Durations
Menu Cost κ 5% Price Durations
Demand elasticity σ 5 Steady State Mark-up
Demand super-elasticity ε 3
Table 7: Parameter Values
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